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1. Introduction 
Invasive meningococcal disease (IMD) results from infection with Neisseria 
meningitidis (Nm) and is associated with high case-fatality rates (CFRs) and long-
term sequelae among survivors, including neurologic complications, loss of limbs, 
hearing loss, and paralysis [1]. The most common manifestations of IMD are 
meningitis and septicemia; however, other forms may arise, such as septic arthritis, 
pericarditis and bacteremic pneumonia [2]. Based on the immunochemistry and 
genetics of the Nm capsular polysaccharides, 12 serogroups have been identified, 
with 6 (A, B, C, W, X and Y) accounting for the majority of all cases of IMD worldwide 
[3, 4]. The geographical distribution and epidemic potential of Nm strains differ. IMD 
may occur sporadically, in small clusters, as localized outbreaks, or as large 
outbreaks or epidemics [5]. Adequate surveillance is paramount for accurate 
epidemiological data and, in turn, initiation of appropriate prevention strategies [6].  
 
2.  Methods 
Since 2009, the Global Meningococcal Initiative (GMI) has held various regional and 
global meetings in efforts to prevent IMD worldwide through education, research and 
international co-operation [7]. In March 2018, the GMI organised a global roundtable 
meeting with a multidisciplinary group of scientists and clinicians representing 
institutions from Latin America, United States of America (U.S.A.), Canada, Europe, 
Russia, the Asia-Pacific region, China, East Asia, the African meningitis belt, 
Southern Africa, Northern Africa and the Middle East. Each delegate gave an update 
on IMD epidemiology and the surveillance, prevention and control strategies in place 
for IMD in their region. To date, the GMI has published 10 key global 
recommendations for IMD (Table 1) [4, 7].  
The specific objectives for this meeting were to: (i) provide an update on 
global IMD surveillance and epidemiology, including epidemic potential of Nm 
strains; (ii) review current prevention and control strategies from a global 
perspective; (iii) share lessons learned and experience gained from IMD 
immunization programs used across the globe, including the use of conjugate 
vaccines; (iv) discuss the emergence of antibiotic resistance and its mechanisms; (v) 
discuss the potential risk of IMD in high-risk groups, including mass gathering 
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attendees, and recommendations for immunization; and (vi) outline proposals for 
global initiatives for IMD prevention. This paper summarizes the key discussion 
points from the meeting to raise awareness of key challenges and to help inform 
global and regional recommendations for IMD prevention. 
 
3. Results 
3.1. Review of global meningococcal disease surveillance and epidemiology  
National IMD laboratory-based public health surveillance enables detection of IMD 
and assists with a prompt and effective response, and is therefore fundamental for 
IMD prevention. Importantly, IMD surveillance identifies the serogroup responsible 
and geographical distribution, which directly informs the subsequent prevention 
strategies employed, including vaccination [6]. Additionally, epidemiological data 
post-vaccination can be used to determine vaccine impact and effectiveness [8]. The 
majority of countries represented at the meeting had IMD surveillance systems in 
place, although structures and methodologies vastly differed. The differences were 
predominately attributed to structural complexity (national vs. regional), necessity to 
report IMD cases rather than meningitis only, and laboratory capabilities (i.e. 
capacity and resources). In some instances, sentinel surveillance was considered 
adequate (e.g. Northern Africa and China) and in others, national surveillance 
systems were well established and included detailed laboratory analyses (e.g. United 
Kingdom (U.K.) and South Africa). Further, some countries implemented a regular 
national bulletin (e.g. some African countries and Russia) to support communication 
efforts between neighboring countries/regions in terms of laboratory data.  
 
3. 1. 1. Incidence of meningococcal disease 
Due to the diverse standards of IMD surveillance systems globally and 
country/regional differences in IMD epidemiology, incidence estimates for countries 
represented at the meeting varied drastically, particularly in terms of the time 
period(s) cited. Overall, current country-specific incidence levels of IMD reported 
during the meeting ranged from 0.01–0.02 cases per 100,000 persons per year in 
Mexico (2014–2017) [9] to 2─3.6 cases per 100,000 persons per year in Morocco 
(2012–2016) [7, 10]. The incidence of IMD cases per 100,000 population was 0.70, 
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0.12, and 0.30 in Europe [11], U.S.A. [12] and Canada in 2015 [13], respectively. In 
China, the IMD incidence rate was 0.05 cases per 100,000 population based on data 
from 2006 to 2014 [14]. The incidence of IMD was reported as 0.45–1.0, 1.6 and 
0.23 cases per 100,000 persons in Russia (2010–2016) [15], New Zealand (2016) 
[16], and South Africa (2016) [17], respectively. IMD incidence differed across East 
Asia, with between 0.01 and 0.03 cases per 100,000 persons per year since 2011 in 
Taiwan [18], and reports of between 1 and 58 cases between 2002 and 2010 in 
Korea ([NNDSS data collected by personal communication; unreferenced]), and 
between 7 and 21 cases reported annually since 1999 in Japan [19]. Further, the 
number of cases per 100,000 persons in 2006 was 0.01–0.08 and 0.028 in Korea 
and Japan, respectively [20]. The incidence of IMD in Latin America varied widely in 
the last decade, ranging from <0.1 cases per 100,000 persons in countries such as 
Bolivia, Cuba, Mexico, Paraguay, and Peru to nearly 2 cases per 100,000 persons in 
Brazil [21]. The meningitis belt of sub-Saharan Africa warrants a special mention 
given the unprecedented decline in IMD incidence levels from more than 100 cases 
to 0.02 cases per 100,000 population between 2011 and 2013 following the 
introduction of a monovalent serogroup A meningococcal tetanus toxoid conjugate 
vaccine (PsA-TT; MenAfriVac®) from 2010 [22].  
 
3.1.2. Serogroup distribution 
Surveillance data indicated that the incidence and prevalence of Nm serogroups 
continually varies both geographically and temporally [23, 24]. Currently, 
meningococcal serogroup B (MenB) is a major cause of IMD in North America, 
South America, Australia, North Africa, and Europe, although a decreasing incidence 
trend is being observed [25], which was supported by the data presented from other 
countries at the 2018 GMI meeting [10, 11, 26-30]. The incidence and prevalence of 
MenB naturally fluctuates over time and is currently at an all-time low; the reasons 
for this was unknown, but it was hypothesized that the introduction of a smoking ban 
in public places in some countries may have played a role. Meningococcal serogroup 
C (MenC) was also reported as one of the most prevalent serogroups in Brazil [31], 
China [6], Russia [15, 29], India [32], and Niger/Nigeria [33, 34]. In India, the 
predominant serogroup was meningococcal serogroup A (MenA). In Japan and 
Southern Africa (Mozambique) meningococcal serogroup Y (MenY) [35], and 
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meningococcal serogroup W (MenW) predominated [36], respectively. The 
emergence of MenW and MenY was evident in some countries worldwide [11, 14, 16, 
29, 35-51].  
 
3.1.3. Genomic alterations and epidemic potential of Neisseria meningitidis 
The epidemic potential of a particular Nm strain may be increased by genomic 
alterations that infer antigenic shifts, metabolic shifts, and resistance to antibiotics 
[46, 52-54] . The ST-11 complex (cc11) is associated with outbreaks with high CFRs, 
atypical symptoms (e.g. gastrointestinal findings) and a variety of serogroups (MenC, 
MenW and MenB) [55-58]. The spread of cc11 has been accompanied by capsule 
switching and antigenic shifts, and more recently, adaptation to new niches, e.g. 
through acquisition of gonococcal genes/traits, and the ability to dispense with 
important subcapsular vaccine antigens [37, 59-62]. The MenW cc11 isolates found 
in South Africa likely originated from the Hajj outbreak strain of 2000/2001, which 
may, in turn, have originated from sub-Saharan African strains (Figure 1). MenW 
cc11 isolates found in the U.K. from 2009 onwards, and associated with atypical 
symptoms (diarrhea, vomiting and septic arthritis), likely originated from South 
America, having emerged in Brazil in 2003 before spreading to Argentina and Chile 
[37, 52, 61]. The U.K. strains have since been found in France, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, Australia, and Canada [42, 43, 51, 54, 55, 63].  Further, within the cc11 
population structure, MenB and MenC cc11 isolates were highly interspersed, 
suggesting multiple capsule switch events [37, 62].  
A genetically-altered ST-11 Nm strain has recently emerged as a cause of 
urethritis in males, with no reported differences in clinical presentation compared 
with gonococcal cases [60, 64]. Adaptation to the genitourinary niche was thought to 
be due, in part, to horizontal gene transfer of in-frame norB-aniA between Neisseria 
gonorrhoeae (Ng) and Nm [60, 64]. The loss of the ability to express a capsule was a 
further gonococcal trait that was caused by the deletion of some capsular genes. 
Gain of aniA function has also been described in closely related MenC cc11 isolates 
from IMD cases among men who have sex with men (MSM) [65]. 
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3.1.4. Epidemiology of recent meningococcal disease outbreaks 
The magnitude, and subsequent societal and economic burden, of Nm outbreaks is 
often influenced by country/regional population structures, diagnostic capacity of 
healthcare systems and outbreak response (vaccination/prophylaxis). In the U.S.A., 
there have been numerous university outbreaks [12, 66-70]; MenB predominated, 
with MenC more commonly seen in community-based outbreaks. Examples of 
university outbreaks between 2008 and 2017 involving MenB include Ohio University 
(2008-2010) [70], Princeton University (2013-2014) [67, 68], and Rutgers University 
[69]. In Africa, the high incidence of IMD was thought to be due to the dry season 
and start of the Harmattan (dry and sandy east wind) in sub-Saharan Africa, which 
favors colonization and transmission of Nm in the pharynx [6]. Historically, >80% of 
Nm outbreaks in the meningitis belt were caused by MenA [6]. As noted previously, 
MenA IMD cases reached 100 cases per 100,000 population in sub-Saharan Africa 
before the introduction of the MenA-TT conjugate vaccine immunization program 
[22]. By 2017, MenA had significantly decreased, MenW was relatively stable and 
MenX and MenC had started to increase [71]. The distribution of MenX and MenC 
within the African meningitis belt was extensive due to cross-border spread. A novel 
MenC ST-10217 strain, causing epidemics of meningitis in Nigeria in 2013 and Niger 
in 2015 has been shown to spread over a longer period of time during the spring 
season, as compared with other epi emic strains in Africa [33, 34, 72]. Genomic 
analysis revealed that the strain was not genetically related to any MenC strains 
previously identified in Africa [33]. In April 2017, 31 IMD cases were reported, 
including 13 deaths, following attendance at the funeral of a religious leader in 
Liberia [73]. The outbreak was associated with atypical symptoms (diarrhea, 
vomiting and mental confusion) and metagenomic analysis revealed the presence of 
a strain with 91–98% similarity to ST-10217 in 6 of the 10 specimens analyzed, the 
remaining 4 specimens were inconclusive [73, 74]. This strain appears to be evolving 
and likely has epidemic potential [75]. Outbreaks have also been reported among 
military personnel. Indeed, the incidence of IMD is higher among soldiers in Korea 
than the national average, with 2.2 cases per 100,000 persons reported per year 
[76]. The novel serogroup C cc4821 emerged in China in 2003 and was responsible 
for the outbreaks in Anhui in China from 2003 to 2005 and has rapidly spread to 
most provinces of China, and there was also evidence of capsular switching between 
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MenC and MenB [77, 78]. Continued epidemiological and sentinel surveillance of 
IMD could help determine the epidemic potential of Nm sublineages to inform future 
prevention strategies.  
 
3.2. Review of current global meningococcal disease prevention and control 
strategies  
There are marked differences in global prevention strategies, in terms of vaccination 
and antimicrobial prophylaxis. There are three types of vaccination: (i) 
polysaccharide; (ii) conjugate; and (iii) protein. In brief, polysaccharide vaccines are 
composed of pure bacterial cell wall polysaccharides, whereas conjugate vaccines 
are made by covalently bonding an antigen to an immunogenic carrier protein (e.g. 
tetanus toxoid, diphtheria toxoid or diphtheria toxoid variant CRM197) to enhance 
and maintain immunological B-cell memory [79]. This is particularly crucial for 
individual protection against IMD due to the generally short incubation period. Other 
advantages of conjugate vaccines over polysaccharide vaccines include the ability to 
impart herd protection by preventing acquisition of meningococci nasopharyngeal 
carriage among vaccinees [80] (see section 3.3.1), and lack of hypo-responsiveness 
with repeated dosing [7, 79, 81, 82]. Several conjugate vaccines are available 
worldwide [83-92], with availability and licenced age differing by country.  In contrast, 
protein-based vaccines include toxoids (inactivated bacterial toxin) and subunit or 
subvirion products, and are used when the use of a polysaccharide or conjugate is 
not possible (see section 3.3.2).  
Some countries provide vaccination via National Immunisation Programmes 
(NIPs) and others provide vaccinations to high-risk populations (e.g. conjugate 
MenACWY in India) or for outbreak control only (e.g. MenB vaccine in Canada; 
polysaccharide MenA and MenAC vaccines in Russia; polysaccharide vaccines in 
the African meningitis belt). The optimal approach is to include vaccination via NIPs 
to maximize coverage; however, this decision is often determined by cost-
effectiveness analyses [7].  A number of factors influence cost-effectiveness, 
including variables to incorporate, how to capture benefits and uncertainty, 
comparators, time-period and how to value items in the future. In some countries 
where vaccines are not provided free of charge, patients may pay for vaccines 
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through the private healthcare sector. The prevailing factor for vaccination 
recommendations is the country- and serogroup-specific incidence of Nm by age 
group, highlighting the importance of continual surveillance to ensure vaccinations 
are available to those most in need in a timely manner.  Conjugate vaccines, 
especially MenA, MenC and MenACWY, are used in many countries, except 
Northern Africa, Middle East and China where polysaccharides are used [6, 7, 47].  
In recent years, there has been increasing use of multivalent vaccines, with 
the polysaccharide and conjugate meningococcal serogroups A, C, W and Y 
(MenACWY) vaccine the most widely implemented. In the U.S.A., the MenACWY 
conjugate vaccine has been recommended as part of the routine immunization 
program for adolescents aged 11 to 12 years, with a booster dose at age 16 years, 
since 2005. The U.K. switched from MenC to MenACWY in adolescents in 2015 [93], 
Chile included the MenACWY conjugate vaccine in the NIP in 2012, Argentina added 
MenACWY to their NIP in 2018, and MenACWYX is planned for widespread use 
across sub-Saharan Africa by 2022. Despite MenB being one of the most prevalent 
serogroups worldwide and some countries incorporating it into their NIP (e.g. U.K., 
Andorra, Lithuania, Italy and Ireland) [94-97], there are countries that do not yet have 
a MenB vaccine licensed (e.g. Turkey and African countries).  
 
3.3. Lessons learned from immunization programs and research worldwide 
3.3.1. Importance of conjugate vaccines in the prevention of meningococcal 
disease 
Implementation of the MenC conjugate vaccine into the NIP and the accompanying 
catch-up campaign in the U.K. in 1999 [98], significantly reduced the incidence of 
IMD and carriage of MenC [80]. Due to vaccine effectiveness waning rapidly in 
young children, as indicated by poor persistence of MenC antibodies, the 
introduction of a ‘booster’ in adolescents in the U.K. in 2013 was intended to 
maintain antibody levels and hence, offer continued protection against IMD and 
MenC carriage. In response to an unexpected rise in MenW cases in the U.K., Public 
Health England introduced the MenACWY conjugate vaccine into the routine 
adolescent school program in 2015. The vaccine was administered to adolescents 
aged 14 and 15 years old, as well as students attending University for the first time 
(Figure 2, [99]). However, despite 71% vaccination coverage with the MenACWY 
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conjugate vaccine at one university, a cross-sectional study showed that carriage of 
MenW increased substantially in first-year university students [100]. Additionally,  the 
introduction of a monovalent MenA conjugate vaccine in Africa successfully reduced 
invasive disease and carriage rates by inducing direct and indirect (herd) protection, 
respectively [101-104]. As mentioned previously, multivalent vaccines are being 
used more frequently with the aim of providing broader protection against IMD than 
monovalent vaccines. However, it is important to acknowledge that we still need 
more evidence to understand the true impact of multivalent conjugate vaccines 
against other serogroups.  
 
3.3.2. Importance of MenB protein vaccines 
Polysaccharide-based MenB vaccines do not exist. The alpha-2 linked polysialic acid 
of MenB is identical to that found on the surface of human neuronal cells, and thus, 
such vaccines would be poorly immunogenic and could potentially evoke an 
autoimmune response [105]. The approach was therefore to identify non-capsular 
antigens that are surface-exposed, conserved and can induce serum bactericidal 
antibodies. Outer membrane vesicle (OMV) vaccines were used in countries such as 
Norway, Cuba, Brazil, Chile, France, to control clonal MenB outbreaks in the 1980s, 
and also in New Zealand from 2004 to 2008 [106]. OMV vaccinations are still used in 
Cuba; they can provide protection when an IMD outbreak shares similar (not 
necessarily identical) PorA to that included in the vaccine [107]. Following the 
publication of the first meningococcal genome, reverse vaccinology was used to 
develop a vaccine comprising 3 primary recombinant antigens: (i) factor H-binding 
protein (fHbp); (ii) Neisserial adhesin A (NadA), and (iii) Neisseria Heparin-Binding 
Antigen (NHBA). In addition, it includes the OMV expressing PorA from the New 
Zealand strain, PorA P1.4 [108-110]. Since the introduction of the 4CMenB vaccine 
(Bexsero®) in 2015 in the U.K., 3 million doses have been administered and there 
has been a significant decline in the number of MenB cases among infants and 
toddlers [111]. A reported 2-dose vaccine effectiveness of 82.9% (95% CI 
24.1─95.2) was reported against all MenB cases during the first 10 months of the 
program [111]. This was equivalent to a vaccine effectiveness of 94.2% against the 
highest predicted MenB strain coverage of 88% [111]. Current published data 
suggest that the 4CMenB vaccine has limited, if any, effect on the carriage of MenB 
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[112]. Although the 4CMenB vaccine is reactogenic [113], recent surveillance data 
do not support initial concerns with respect to increased risk of Kawasaki disease 
and seizures [114]. The 4CMenB vaccine has the potential to offer protection against 
meningococci belonging to other serogroups. Interestingly, infants that received the 
4CMenB vaccine showed serum bactericidal antibody activity against the 
hypervirulent MenW ST-11 strain [115], which is in line with the observed reduction 
in MenW cases among infants [116]. The Cuban OMV meningococcal BC vaccine 
(VA-MENGOC-BC®) has been used effectively in Cuba, and other Latin American 
countries [117, 118], to control MenB disease [119-125]. Over 30 years, ~60 million 
doses of the Cuban OMV vaccine have been administered demonstrating a good 
safety and tolerability profile with a significant decrease in the incidence of IMD post-
vaccination [117, 118, 120].  
Given that Nm and Ng belong to the same genus, there are considerable 
structural similarities between the PorB protein found in Nm and Ng [126]. Further, 
the genes encoding fHbp and NHBA may also be found, and the corresponding 
proteins expressed, in Ng [127]; although, fHbp is not surface-expressed in Ng [128], 
and there are differences in the nucleotide and amino acid sequences between the 2 
species [127]. Data, albeit limited, showed that meningococcal recombinant protein 
and OMV-based vaccines may provide protection against Ng in Canada and Cuba 
(Figure 3) [129, 130], following a similar observation in New Zealand. An ecological 
study in Saquenay-Lac-St-Jean, Quebec, suggested that the 4CMenB vaccine may 
offer some protection from Ng infection among individuals aged 14–20 years [131]. 
More in-depth analyses are ongoing to fully establish the nature of the relationship 
between the 4CMenB vaccine and Ng infection rate.  
 
3.3.3. New approaches for vaccination strategies 
The use of additional multivalent polysaccharide vaccines, as well as concomitant 
administration of multivalent vaccines with protein-based vaccines, to provide 
broader protection against IMD, are being considered and actively researched. 
Evidence to date does not indicate any major safety signals for the multivalent 
MenACWY vaccines; however, there was a significant association between Bell’s 
palsy and MenACWY-CRM when administered concomitantly with other vaccines. 
Further, there was no association when the vaccine was administered alone [132], 
thus highlighting the need for further investigations. The immunogenicity of co-
A
cc
ep
te
d 
M
an
us
cr
ip
t
 
administration of MenC-CRM and 4CMenB has also been studied with no immediate 
safety or effectiveness concerns [133]. New multivalent vaccines are being 
developed, including a pentavalent MenACWYX vaccine for Africa, which is currently 
being studied in clinical trials.  
 
3.3.4. Use of meningococcal modeling in outbreaks and persistence of 
vaccine protection 
A useful tool for informing IMD control strategies is transmission modeling, which can 
be used to predict IMD epidemiology, including the impact of proposed vaccination 
programs. Models should ideally incorporate data from disease surveillance, carriage 
studies and sero-epidemiology. As models are, by definition, simplifications of real 
world scenarios, they should be considered an additional, rather than a definitive, 
tool for decision making. Nevertheless, they have been used to inform vaccination 
programs. For example, modeling for the conjugate MenC vaccine in the U.K. 
showed the significant decline in IMD cases when herd immunity was taken into 
consideration [134]. Modeling of PsA-TT used an age-structured transmission 
dynamic model to capture key epidemiological features of MenA in the African 
meningitis belt, including periodic epidemics, seasonality, varying sizes of epidemics, 
variable risk of disease age, carriage by age, immunity from carriage, and 
transmission between asymptomatic carriers [135]. Ultimately, the model highlighted 
the importance of the introduction of the vaccine into routine Extended Program on 
Immunization (EPI) or periodic mass vaccination in 1–4 year olds to avoid 
resurgence of MenA approximately 10–20 years after the initial mass campaign in 1–
29 year olds [135]. Additionally, modeling for the introduction of the 4CMenB vaccine 
into the U.K. suggested that, if herd effects are assumed, long-term protection would 
be expected by vaccinating adolescents [136]. However, in the absence of herd 
effects, vaccination during infancy would be preferable, and since herd effects for 
meningococcal protein-based vaccines are unclear, this debate is ongoing [136]. 
IMD modeling may be used to better understand the importance of particular 
assumptions, such as the persistence of protection of a vaccine, which can 
determine the need for, and timing of, booster vaccinations. For example, if the 
duration of protection is short (e.g. 5 years), booster vaccinations in those 
immunized at younger ages may be warranted to prevent resurgence. In fact, the 
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aforementioned PsA-TT model demonstrated that resurgence of MenA occurs earlier 
and with higher incidence if persistence is assumed to be 5 rather than 10 years 
[135]. Strategies such as catch-up campaigns and the routine immunization of older 
children could be considered if the duration of protection is known to be short.  
Due to low incidence of IMD, it is not feasible to conduct efficacy studies for 
the licensure of meningococcal conjugate vaccines. These vaccines have been 
licensed on the basis of safety and immunogenicity data. This therefore requires 
surrogates of protection. Surrogates of protection, which are required for IMD 
modeling, are unknown for MenA. The use of human complement serum bactericidal 
assay (hSBA) may not be an appropriate correlate of protection for MenA and 
utilization of different MenA strains in rabbit complement serum bactericidal assay 
(rSBA) yield different lengths of protection [137]. Based on serogroup A-specific 
immunoglobulin G (IgG), a booster campaign would be required after 3 years for 
children aged 1─4 years following the PsA-TT campaign [138]. In contrast, a booster 
campaign would be required after 8 years for children aged 1─4 years following the 
PsA-TT campaign based on strain, A3125, and antibody persistence remains high, 
even 5 years following primary vaccination based on strain F8238 [139]. As such, 
further understanding of correlates of protection is needed. 
 
3.4. Emergence of antibiotic resistance 
Increased use of antibiotics worldwide for various bacterial infections has had a 
detrimental impact on antimicrobial resistance in bacteria. Nm is still susceptible to 
most antibiotics that are used for treatment and prophylaxis of IMD; however, the 
incidence of strains with reduced susceptibility to penicillin (as indicated by increased 
minimum inhibitory concentrations [MIC] towards the standardised breakpoint of non-
susceptibility) is increasing worldwide [140]. Non-susceptibility (or resistance) to 
penicillin arises from modifications in bacterial penicillin-binding proteins (PBPs); 
enzymes that are involved in peptidoglycan biosynthesis, which bind to penicillin and 
other beta-lactam antibiotics [140]. Alterations in the PBP2 protein encoded by the 
penA gene led to modifications of the bacteria’s peptidoglycan structure, as well as a 
10-fold reduction in its affinity for penicillin [141], thereby reducing its susceptibility to 
the agent [140, 142]. Alterations of the penA gene most likely occurred through 
A
cc
ep
te
d 
M
an
us
cr
ip
t
 
horizontal gene transfer from other species of the genus Neisseria (Neisseria 
perflava, Neisseria mucosa and Neisseria cinerea), producing a penA allele that has 
a mosaic structure. Of concern, isolates harbouring the allele penA327 showing 
reduced susceptibly to penicillin and third-generation cephalosporins were identified 
in 2012 [141]. The allele was found to originate from Ng [141]. The penA1C allele is 
currently only found in Ng, but carries a high level of resistance to penicillin and third-
generation cephalosporins. penA1C differs from penA327 by only 1 nucleotide, thus 
there is a risk that isolates with antibiotic resistance (rather than reduced 
susceptibility) may emerge in the future. Encouragingly, isolates resistant to 
rifampicin and ciprofloxacin are rare and heterogeneous [143]. Resistance to 
rifampicin arises from alterations in the rpoB gene, which lead to marked increases 
in the MIC of the isolates (>1.0 mg/L) [143]. Isolates that harbour a modified rpoB 
gene are rare and have only been identified in Europe [143], but they remain a 
concern, especially in countries that use rifampicin as first-line antibiotic for 
prophylaxis. Ciprofloxacin resistance involves mutations in the gyrA gene [144]. 
Isolates resistant to ciprofloxacin have been identified in France, India, Italy, Spain, 
and Sweden, and in 2009, an outbreak of resistant isolates was reported in the 
U.S.A. [144, 145]. Ciprofloxacin-resistant isolates have also been reported in 
Argentina and, in China, more than 70% of Nm strains are non-susceptible [46, 146]. 
Different Nm strains in China have shown non-susceptibility to ciprofloxacin [146], as 
well as nalidixic acid [6]. Specifically, molecular profiling indicated a high prevalence 
of Nm quinolone non-susceptibility in Shanghai, which was associated with hyper-
virulent IMD lineages cc4821 and cc5, giving rise to 2 quinolone-resistant strains; 
cc4821-R1-C/B and cc5-R14-A [147]. Further, the MIC values of several antibiotics 
used in China to treat Nm have increased, and some ciprofloxacin-resistant strains 
obtained from healthy carriers possessed identical gyrA sequences to those 
obtained from individuals with IMD [146]. Global antibiotic resistance surveillance is 
therefore warranted to monitor changes in antibiotic susceptibility of Nm and to 
ensure IMD cases, including epidemics, are treated effectively.   
 
3.5. IMD in high-risk groups  
Country or region-specific immunization programs generally target populations 
considered most at risk of IMD or carriage. The incidence of IMD is highest among 
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children <1 year and adolescents/young adults [148]. In addition to age, there are 
other populations considered at high risk of IMD, including individuals with functional 
or anatomic asplenia, complement deficiency and human immunodeficiency virus 
(HIV) [12, 149-151]. Indeed, individuals with complement deficiency and HIV have an 
approximately 1000-fold and 10-fold increased risk of IMD, respectively [82, 152-
154]. Unvaccinated and vaccinated patients taking eculizumab for paroxysmal 
nocturnal hemoglobinuria (PNH) or atypical hemolytic uremic syndrome (aHUS) 
have a markedly increased risk for IMD. There is varied guidance on the use of 
antibiotic prophylaxis in such patients [12, 155]. MSM are also considered a high-risk 
group [154], with a high incidence of MenC in both outbreak and non-outbreak 
settings. The cc11 strain was responsible for IMD outbreaks among MSM [156], and 
HIV infection is likely responsible for most of the increased risk among MSM. 
Following genomic analysis of the new clone of MenC identified in MSM, the strain 
was found to have acquired the capacity to spread via sexual transmission, as well 
as via respiratory droplets [65]. Additionally, numerous laboratory-acquired IMD 
cases have occurred, with half of cases resulting in death [157]. As such, it is also 
important to offer laboratory workers meningococcal vaccines and to ensure all 
safety procedures are followed. 
There has been an increased incidence of IMD during some mass gatherings. 
With the exclusion of the Hajj and Umrah, the IMD burden at mass gatherings was 
66 per 100,000 persons based on 13 studies published between 1991 and 2015 
[158]. Such events often involve international travel, crowding and engagement in 
social behaviors that increase the likelihood of Nm transmission (e.g. smoking, 
kissing, sharing of food/drink) [37, 52, 159]. Historically, the Hajj has been 
associated with local and international outbreaks of IMD, but the last major outbreak 
occurred in 2000 [160-164]. Consequently, a number of preventative measures are 
in place, including vaccination with a quadrivalent MenACWY vaccine for all national 
and international pilgrims, residents of Mecca and Medina, Hajj workers and 
personnel working at ports of entry. Ciprofloxacin is given as chemoprophylaxis to 
pilgrims arriving from the African meningitis belt and there are awareness campaigns 
on IMD and preventative measures available. IMD outbreaks have been associated 
with the Norwegian ‘russefeiring’ since the 1990s, an event involving 60,000 
adolescents partying for several weeks [165].  In 2011, there were 4 cases that were 
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attributable to MenY. Since 2011, vaccination with the tetravalent MenACWY 
conjugate vaccine and a MenB vaccine has been recommended for those aged 
between 16 and 19 years. Six cases of IMD, confirmed as MenW: P1.5,2,36-2: F1-1: 
ST-11 (cc11), occurred among Scottish and Swedish individuals associated with the 
World Scout Jamboree (WSJ) in 2015, an international mass gathering, held in 
Japan, where 33,000 teenagers of 14–17 years gathered from 162 countries. The 
novel MenW strain was found to have descended from the aforementioned MenW 
cc11 South American strain sub-lineage [52, 166]. In addition, the probable 
transmission of MenW from Scouts to passengers seated nearby during an 
international flight was reported, but the incident did not fulfil European Centre for 
Disease Control and Prevention (ECDC) criteria for flight contact [166, 167]. All the 
aforementioned examples of outbreaks reported during mass gatherings stimulated 
a debate around the definition of a mass gathering and the control strategies that 
should be implemented. The World Health Organization (WHO) defined a mass 
gathering as a high concentration of people, at a specific location, for a specific 
purpose, over a set period of time, which has the potential to strain the planning and 
response resources of the country or community; however, the WHO does not 
currently recommend routine immunizations for mass gatherings, other than the Hajj 
and Umrah. Sports events (e.g. the Olympics), music festivals, high-profile funerals 
and military camps may also be rated as mass gatherings, but reports on 
subsequent IMD are scarce [168]. Irrespective of the definition, there are wider 
considerations regarding the association of IMD clusters within international mass 
gatherings, including markers of known risk factors, increased carriage/disease 
incidence, viral illness, close living, close contact, sharing food/drink, and air travel.  
 
3.6. Global initiatives for IMD prevention 
Despite meningitis and neonatal sepsis (which is almost indistinguishable from 
meningitis in neonates) together being the second biggest infectious killer of children 
under 5 years of age globally [169], many of the major global strategies for health do 
not refer to meningitis as an issue warranting prioritisation. This is in contrast to 
diseases such as malaria, rabies and cholera that now have global action plans to 
2030. A meeting organized by the Meningitis Research Foundation (MRF), in 
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collaboration with the WHO, was held in the U.K. in 2017 with diverse 
representation, including the African meningitis belt health ministries, patient groups, 
pharmaceutical companies, researchers, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and 
Public Health England to address this gap. Specific calls to action arising from the 
meeting, included to: (i) protect at-risk populations globally through routine and 
catch-up immunization programs, outbreak strategies,  development of new rapid 
diagnostic tests, and continued research into pathogens that cause meningitis; (ii) 
maximize benefit of existing vaccines by developing targeted campaigns, a new 
multivalent conjugate vaccine and strengthening the capacity of networks and 
laboratories working within the African meningitis belt; and (iii) provide a step-change 
in support available to meningitis survivors and their families, working with national 
and regional healthcare systems to promote information to populations, making 
meningitis education a routine part of health information campaigns, and establishing 
national and international networks of best practice to raise disease awareness. The 
WHO is currently developing proposals and seeking funding to create a global 
roadmap for meningitis through to 2030. The MRF is working on 4 initiatives that will 
help underpin the new global roadmap, including a global data paper and meningitis 
impact portal, a global meningococcal genome library, rapid diagnostics tests and a 
research network. 
 
4. Discussion 
A relatively large proportion of the meeting focused on IMD surveillance, 
epidemiology, prevention and control strategies worldwide. Of note, MenB and MenC 
are still a major cause of IMD worldwide, with the emergence of MenW and MenY in 
recent years. Further, cc11 has spread internationally, accompanied by the ability of 
cc11 strains (e.g. MenC) to adapt to new niches, acquire gonococcal genes/traits 
(including antibiotic resistance) and dispense with important subcapsular vaccine 
antigens [37, 59-62]. Additionally, MenX and MenC have spread extensively within 
Africa due to cross-border transmission. Importantly, the GMI stressed that 
experiences with the ST-10217 in Nigeria and Niger and ST-11 MenW in the U.K. 
can further knowledge on the evolution of Nm strains. Ongoing surveillance and 
genomic analyses are therefore crucial in the prevention of IMD. 
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The magnitude and social and economic impact of an outbreak varied 
considerably between high-income and low- to middle-income countries and was 
influenced by many factors, such as country/regional population structures, 
diagnostic capacity of healthcare systems and outbreak response 
(vaccination/prophylaxis). Although individual capacity varies considerably, countries 
and health organizations can continue to learn from the experiences and strategies 
of others across the globe where IMD has been prevented or controlled. Indeed, 
such lessons were a focus of this meeting and have fed into the existing GMI 
recommendations (Table 1).  
The success of a MenC conjugate vaccination program in the U.K. and 
elsewhere was used to reinforce the vital role of herd protection in preventing the 
spread of IMD, and the development of new multivalent vaccines, as well as co-
administration of vaccines may provide broader protection against MD.  An update 
on the surveillance of OMV-based vaccination in infants and toddlers in England 
suggested that the 4CMenB vaccine provided protectio  against a hypervirulent 
MenW strain [115]. Data presented, albeit limited, showed that OMV-based vaccines 
against MenB may provide protection against Ng in Canada and Cuba [129, 130]; 
however, it was emphasized that further analyses were needed. Finally, transmission 
models were highlighted as a useful tool to predict MD epidemiology and support 
control strategies, including the nee  for, and timing of, booster vaccinations. 
However, the GMI cautioned that models were simplifications of real world scenarios 
so should be considered as an additional, rather than definitive, tool for decision 
making.   
Although the GMI affirmed that Nm was susceptible to the antibiotics that 
were currently used for treatment and prophylaxis of IMD, it was cautioned that there 
was evidence that reduced susceptibility to antibiotics is increasing worldwide [140, 
143]. Antibiotics are undoubtedly one of the most important tools used in the 
prophylaxis and treatment of IMD to prevent related fatalities and sequelae. The 
identification of several strains of Nm that have shown non-susceptibility to select 
antibiotics adds to the concern that antibiotic resistance may emerge in the near 
future and cause a substantial setback in the progress of the global management of 
IMD. Clearly, global antibiotic resistance surveillance is imperative to ensure the 
continued efficacy of all IMD treatments. 
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IMD outbreaks during the Hajj, the WSJ in Japan in 2015 and the Norwegian 
‘russefeiring’, prompted discussion around the definition of a mass gathering and the 
control strategies that should be implemented. The WHO does not currently 
recommend routine immunizations for mass gatherings, other than the Hajj and 
Umrah. It was debated whether sports events (e.g. the Olympics), music festivals, 
high-profile funerals and military camps should be included.   
Patient populations at high risk of IMD were each discussed in turn, and 
included individuals with asplenia, complement deficiencies and HIV. Interestingly, 
administration of eculizumab to a vaccinated patient with PNH, who later died, raised 
the question whether better guidance was needed on the use of vaccines and 
chemoprophylaxis in such patients [12, 155]. MSM and laboratory workers were also 
flagged as high-risk groups.  
To date, vaccination programs have been effective in substantially reducing 
the incidence of IMD in many countries across the world (e.g. the control of MenA in 
the African meningitis belt since the phased introduction of PsA-TT in 2010). It is 
crucial that countries continue to be reactive to the changing epidemiology of IMD 
moving forward, and regularly update routine and emergency vaccination programs 
to ensure a quick and effective response following the inevitable emergence of new 
Nm strains. A key strategy to reduce the carriage and incidence of IMD would be to 
induce herd protection in populations where it is currently lacking. The targeted 
immunization of high-risk patient populations, other than children and adolescents, 
may directly prevent outbreaks and significantly reduce IMD transmission. Of course, 
achieving and sustaining herd protection worldwide will be challenging given diverse 
standards in IMD management.  Worldwide coordinated, sustained and long-term 
strategies, alongside vigilant surveillance is urgently required in all countries to 
continue to lower IMD-related morbidity and mortality. 
 
5. Summary 
Based upon the data presented, it is clear that the epidemiology of IMD is constantly 
evolving, highlighting the need for surveillance and policies for prevention and 
control. Increasing application of genomic analyses worldwide has accelerated 
knowledge around the local evolution of all hyper-virulent Nm lineages, including the 
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accumulation of genetic changes. Therefore, genomic analyses are needed to 
determine the epidemic potential of sublineages, and for reliable tracking of 
meningococcal strains and initiation of appropriate vaccination programs.  
Conjugate vaccines are generally superior to polysaccharides. They can also 
prevent acquisition of meningococci pharyngeal carriage among vaccinees, which 
proved to be crucial for the success of the immunization programs with the MenC 
and MenA conjugate vaccines. However, revaccination is needed in some 
populations that remain at risk.  Such policy decisions can be informed by 
mathematical modeling. Vaccination of high-risk populations and attendees at mass 
gatherings associated with an increased risk of IMD is warranted; however, the 
definition of a mass gathering may need to be revisited given that IMD outbreaks 
have been associated with sports events, festivals, high-profile funerals and military 
camps. Although Nm is still susceptible to antibiotics used for treatment and 
prophylaxis of IMD, reduced susceptibility to antibiotics continues to be a concern. 
As such, global antibiotic resistance surveillance is recommended. Both the MRF 
and WHO have initiatives in development, including the development of a new task 
force and roadmap for meningitis to 2030. 
 
6. Expert commentary 
IMD is an important health concern with outbreaks occurring in many areas of the 
world, particularly in low- to middle-income countries where morbidity and mortality 
rates remain high. MenB and MenC remain a major cause of IMD worldwide; 
however, MenA, M nW, MenX and MenY, predominate in a number of different 
countries. In order to reduce the global incidence of IMD, it is imperative that 
countries and health organizations continually learn from the experiences and 
effective strategies implemented by other countries. Of note, the induction of herd 
protection following the implementation of conjugate vaccines into the NIP together 
with catch-up campaigns, as well as the observed potential for protein-based 
vaccines to offer protection against multiple serogroups (e.g. 4CMenB may protect 
against MenB and MenW) and Ng (e.g. protein – and OMV-based vaccines may 
provide protection against Ng in Canada and Cuba, respectively).  
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Currently, vaccines and antimicrobial prophylaxis are the mainstays of IMD 
prevention and have significantly reduced the incidence of IMD in many countries 
worldwide. To continue to reduce the incidence levels of IMD, there are a number of 
key issues that need to be addressed. Evidence gathered to date regarding the 
ability of Nm to adapt genetically, implies that new hyper-virulent strains may emerge. 
Further, the imminent emergence of an antibiotic resistant strain of Nm is a valid and 
growing concern. As antibiotics are undoubtedly one of the most important tools 
used in the prophylaxis and treatment of IMD, an antibiotic-resistant strain could 
cause a substantial setback in the progress of the global management of IMD. 
Ongoing vigilance and genomic analyses will ensure the prompt determination of the 
epidemic potential of Nm strains, to inform the rapid development and 
implementation of appropriate control strategies. At every opportunity, lessons 
should continue to be learned from the emergence of new strains, and the spread of 
other hypervirulent strains to increase knowledge on the evolution of such strains. 
Moreover, global antibiotic resistance surveillance is imperative to ensure the 
continued efficacy of all IMD treatments. 
Many steps are being taken to prevent outbreaks of IMD; however, outbreaks 
still occur and therefore continued efforts are needed. The observed increase in the 
incidence of IMD following some mass gatherings and other highly-attended events 
(e.g. sports fixtures and music festivals) highlights the need to target such events to 
help control the international spread of IMD. As a first step, revisiting the definition of 
mass gathering may prompt initiation of preventative measures for IMD to help 
mitigate the risk of international spread. Additionally, the targeted immunization of 
high-risk patient populations may also prevent IMD. Of course, achieving and 
sustaining IMD protection worldwide will be challenging given diverse standards in 
IMD management; however, continued country- and regional-specific efforts that 
underpin the GMI ethos for international cooperation will help drive an overall 
reduction in the incidence of IMD. 
 
7. Five-year view 
In the next 5 years, the epidemiology of IMD will most likely continue to vary both 
geographically and temporally due to many competing factors. With the 
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implementation of enhanced protection and control strategies, the world will likely 
see a decreasing trend in the overall incidence of IMD; however, factors such as 
differing country/regional surveillance systems and the evolution of new hyper-
virulent Nm strains may pose a threat and lead to an increase in the incidence of 
IMD.  
The identification of several strains of Nm that have shown non-susceptibility 
to select antibiotics adds to the growing concern that antibiotic resistant strains of 
Nm will emerge in the coming years. The GMI recognizes that epidemiological 
surveillance is essential to determine the epidemic potential of Nm strains and inform 
future prevention strategies. In particular, the update of routine and reactive 
vaccination programs with suitable vaccines is necessary for a quick and effective 
response should newly emergent Nm strains become a threat.  
The clinical development and subsequent licensing of 2 pentavalent vaccines, 
MenABCWY and MenACWYX, are likely within the next 5 years. Once added to 
NIPs, these vaccines are expected to play a significant role in the global 
management of IMD through direct and indirect (herd) protection.  
Currently, the prevailing factor for vaccination recommendations is the 
country-specific incidence of respective Nm serogroups across age groups; however, 
the application of protection strategies to other high-risk groups, such as individuals 
with asplenia, complement deficiencies and HIV, persons receiving eculizumab, 
MSM and travellers to epidemic areas, differs between countries. The GMI agrees 
that targeted routine and catch-up vaccination programs for high-risk patient 
populations is important for this reason, and should be implemented into country and 
region-specific immunization programs within the next 5 years. Further, following 
several IMD outbreaks during events, such as festivals and high-profile funerals, the 
GMI recommend that the definition of mass gathering be revisited and adequate 
preventative measures and control strategies put in place prior to any event with the 
potential to increase the rate of Nm carriage or incidence of IMD. 
The GMI postulates that coordinated, sustained and long-term 
surveillance/vaccination strategies, such as those discussed herein are required to 
improve the management of IMD and lower associated mortality and morbidity. The 
WHO and MRF initiatives to create a global roadmap for IMD through to 2030 are 
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currently in development and will be key to ensuring the continued growth of 
management strategies worldwide. 
 
Key issues 
• In March 2018, the GMI met with a group of multidisciplinary scientists 
representing institutions from several continents across the globe to discuss 
IMD epidemiology, surveillance and protection strategies, with a focus on 
emerging antibiotic resistance and the protection of high-risk populations 
• IMD outbreaks continue to occur in many areas of the world; the magnitude 
and subsequent societal and economic burden varies considerably between 
high income and low- to middle-income countries, and is determined by 
factors such as country/regional population structures, diagnostic capacity of 
healthcare systems and outbreak response (vaccination/prophylaxis) 
• Transmission modeling can be used to inform IMD control strategies and 
predict IMD epidemiology, including the impact of proposed vaccination 
programs 
• The incidence and prevalence of IMD continually varies worldwide, and the 
epidemic potential of a particular Nm strain may be increased by genetic 
alterations that infer antigenic and metabolic shifts, and antibiotic resistance 
• MenB is a major cause of IMD in America, Australia and Europe and a 
decreasing trend is currently being observed worldwide, whereas there is an 
increasing incidence of MenW globally  
• Although vaccination programs have been successful in reducing IMD 
incidence in many countries, the emergence of the new MenC strain (ST-
10217) and variants of ST-11 (cc11) in several serogroups (MenB, MenC and 
MenW), and also unencapsulated urogenital cc11 strains, may pose a threat 
and require close surveillance  
• The GMI recognizes that genetic analyses of IMD cases, together with 
continued epidemiological surveillance of the disease, are needed to 
determine the epidemic potential of Nm strains and inform future prevention 
strategies   
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• There are marked differences in prevention strategies, in terms of vaccination 
and antimicrobial prophylaxis across the globe 
• Several conjugate vaccines are widely available to provide direct protection 
against MenA, MenC, MenW and MenY, that afford many advantages over 
and above those offered by polysaccharide vaccines, such as the ability to 
impart herd protection via the prevention of the acquisition of carriage among 
the vaccinated population 
• To date, Nm is susceptible to antibiotics used in the treatment and prophylaxis 
of IMD; however, several Nm strains in China have shown non-susceptibility 
to select antibiotics raising the concern that strains with antibiotic resistance 
may emerge elsewhere in the future 
• The incidence of IMD is highest among children <1 year and 
adolescents/young adults; however, there are other populations considered to 
be at a high risk of IMD, including individuals with hereditary or acquired 
complement deficiencies, persons receiving eculizumab, those with HIV, 
MSM, laboratory workers, and travelers to epidemic areas and some mass 
gatherings   
• The GMI calls for the continued and regular update of routine and reactive 
vaccination programs with appropriate vaccines, including conjugate 
vaccines, as well as the implementation of targeted immunization of high-risk 
patient populations into country and region-specific immunization programs 
• The GMI continues to drive efforts to prevent IMD worldwide through 
education, research and international cooperation  
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Chinese GMI roundtable meeting in June 2017, and emphasises the 
importance of national epidemiological and laboratory surveillance for 
IMD prevention  
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Table and figures  
Figure 1. Geo-temporal distribution of isolates within distal sublineages of 
meningococcal lineage 11.1.The inset (top-right) depicts a cgMLST (1546 loci) 
neighbour-net phylogenetic network of all 750 geo-temporally diverse cc11 isolates 
and two non-cc11 isolates (cc8 and cc41/44) highlighting the distal region of lineage 
11.1 that bifurcates into two sublineages. Isolates corresponding to this region 
underwent a separate cgMLST (1546 loci) comparison to generate the Neighbor-net 
network in the main figure. Both sublineages contained several clusters, each 
relating to a noteworthy episode of MenW disease. 1 lineage included the strain 
relating to the Hajj outbreak of 2000 onwards (Anglo-French Hajj strain), the 
expansion of endemic MenW:cc11 disease in South Africa from 2003 (endemic 
South African Strain) and a period of MenW:cc11 epidemics in sub-Saharan Africa 
(Burkina Faso/North African Strains). The other sublineage contained clusters 
relating to expanding endemic MenW:cc11 disease in South America and the U.K. 
A
cc
ep
te
d 
M
an
us
cr
ip
t
 
(the South American/U.K. strain). Dots relate to individual cases. The scale bar 
indicates the number of loci differing among the 1546 compared. Figure adapted 
from Figure 3 of reference [37] and reprinted from Journal of Infection, Vol 71/Issue 5, 
J Lucidarme, DM Hill, HB Bratcher, et al. Genomic resolution of an aggressive, 
widespread, diverse and expanding meningococcal serogroup B, C and W lineagep. 
549, 2015, with permission from Elsevier. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Incidence of MenW in the U.K. from 2011/2012 to 2016/2017 [99].  
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Figure 3. Incidence of N. gonorrhoeae vs. N. meningitidis in Cuba (1978–2016)[130]  
 
1. Country‐specific approaches to vaccine prevention are needed because of 
disease variation. 
2. Country‐specific meningococcal policy should be based on local 
epidemiology and economic considerations. 
3. Continued funding of the introduction of MenAfriVac® is an important global 
and regional public health priority. 
4. The Meningitis Vaccine Project (MVP) model should be considered when 
developing other products with markets that are primarily or exclusively in 
low- to middle-income countries. 
5. Travelers to high‐risk areas should be vaccinated against MD according to 
recommendations by public health authorities. 
6. Vaccines against all clinically relevant serogroups (A, B, C, W, X, and Y) 
should be developed. 
7. Conjugate vaccines should replace polysaccharide vaccines whenever cost, 
availability, licensing, and immunization policy allow. However, 
polysaccharide vaccines are still recommended where conjugate vaccines 
are not available. 
8. Laboratory‐based surveillance for IMD should be strengthened (or initiated) 
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to determine the true burden of disease. 
9. Local public health authorities should assess the value of issuing an 
advisory for those attending a planned mass gathering event to be 
vaccinated based on available epidemiologic evidence. 
10. Vaccination of individuals who are HIV positive.  
Table 1. GMI Global Recommendations. 
 
   
 
 
